Rejoinder: Tanga is still the strategic bet, Tanzania can win it

TANGA: AMANI Mrope is right: capital has memory. But memory cuts both ways. Capital is egotistic. It also remembers turnaround.

The debate over whether Aliko Dangote should anchor his next mega-refinery in Tanga, Tanzania, or Mombasa, Kenya, is not just about geography; it is a battle between institutional memory and strategic logic.

The narrative of “Tanga as the underdog” is invalid. While critics point to past bureaucratic hurdles, the logistical and operational reality of 2026 suggests that Tanga is not just a viable alternative; it is the mathematically superior choice.

Study findings on SubSaharan Africa refinery financing challenges demonstrate that financial hurdles transcend a country’s oilproducing history, goodwill or geography. The findings place the burden of bankability on a project’s ability to mitigate cost overruns and minimise political interference in operations.

The logistics case for Tanga is unmatched

In the world of refining, “location, location, location” translates to “feedstock, feedstock, feedstock.” Tanga holds a geographic trump card that Mombasa cannot replicate: the EACOP. Given the gravity of feedstock in this debate, EACOP changes everything.

EACOP terminates at Chongoleani, Tanga. Currently, 650,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Ugandan crude are destined for export through this terminal. If a refinery is built in Tanga, the feedstock is already “at the gate.”

Two attributes are important to bring to the fore, the “Tanga advantage”: First, the cost of distance, which has not been highlighted. Piping that same crude away from Tanga, the EACOP terminal, to Mombasa would add an estimated 2 US dollars to 3US dollars per barrel in tariffs and operational risk. Second, the port depth myth.

Sceptics often cite Tanga’s shallower waters compared to Mombasa’s natural deep-sea harbor. However, in a 17 billion US dollars industrial project, dredging Tanga to a depth of 15 meters is a 200 million US dollars engineering task. That represents roughly 1.2 percent of the total project cost.

In the grand calculus of infrastructure, a shallow port is a temporary inconvenience. However, a lack of feedstock is a permanent crisis. Third, EACOP already terminates at Tanga; fact. With 650,000 bpd of Ugandan crude already landing at Tanga, bypassing this immediate feedstock for Mombasa would invite redundant tariffs and risks that no logical refinery should bear.

Moreover, since dredging the harbor is a measly fraction of the total investment, Tanga’s depth is a solvable engineering line item rather than a strategic dealbreaker.

Exorcising the ghost of Mtwara

Per Amani Mrope (and rightfully so), the potential choice of Mombasa is not just for a port, it is rather, a vote of no confidence in Tanzania’s investment policy stability. The pain could be real. The most significant barrier to investment in Tanzania has never been engineering; it has been the issue of trust. The “Mtwara-like experience” left a bitter taste to many.

Characterised by shifting decisions, broken promises and “negotiatelater” tactics of yesteryears, the Tanzania of today has methodically worked to dismantle those ghosts through legislative and structural reform.

For instance, Tanzania has moved from a “promises” model to a “framework” model. Today there is more price certainty. The TPDC (Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation) now publishes transparent industrial gas tariffs. The era of “build first, negotiate later” is dead.

TISEZA’s (Tanzania Investment and Special Economic Zones Authority) One-Stop Centre endeavour is not just a desk; it is a mandate. With a 14-day Service Level Agreement, the “presidential phone call” has been replaced with a more predictable system.

Furthermore, the Investment Guarantee Act 2022 provides the “ironclad” protection capital requires, with regard to specifically currency convertibility and international arbitration. In effect, there is proof of concept for the ghost of Mtwara.

Look at Dangote’s Mtwara cement plant today. It transitioned from diesel dependency to gas and local coal. It is not just operational; it is profitable. The lesson was not just learned; it was applied.

De-risking Tanga is a 90-day job, not a 5-year dream

Capital doesn’t need sympathy. Capital needs bankability. What Dangote (and others) need is bankability, not sympathy. To win the refinery, Tanzania does not need a five-year plan. What it needs is a 90-day Derisking strategy. It needs an execution window to “table the term sheet.” This entails creating a “plug-andplay” environment for the developer.

Tanzania can table tomorrow morning the following propositions: The establishment of an SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle), a pre-approved partnership between the TPA (Tanzania Ports Authority), EACOP, and the developer that guarantees berth rights and take-orpay structures. Institution of a regulatory scalpel involving the creation of a single regulator, a Refinery Delivery Unit reporting directly to the Prime Minister’s Office.

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This removes the “middlemen” who traditionally slow down largescale energy projects. Offering comprehensive utility and regulatory guarantees to secure the project’s long-term viability. This would include infrastructure assurances, such as a dedicated 300MW power line from Kinyerezi, alongside a “locked” tax and tariff regime.

To ensure enforceability, these terms would be protected by a 25-year stability clause ratified by Parliament utilising the same legal framework established for the LNG subsector. For a refiner, “utility risk” is as scary as “political risk.” Ultimately, it is important to note that capital does not reward vision; it rewards certainty.

Replacing five-year dreams with a 90-day de-risking sprint, can move Tanzania beyond the search for sympathy. It can deliver a “plug-andplay” reality that makes the Tanga refinery not just a possibility, but a bankable inevitability.

Tanga vs. Mombasa: The ESG and Economic Edge

Mombasa is not for free. Yes, Mombasa is an established, bustling port, but it comes with the “baggage” of success. This includes heavy congestion, high land costs, and the volatility of Kenyan fuel subsidy politics. Furthermore, Kenya is an importer of crude.

Tanzania, by refining Ugandan crude, shifts the narrative from “import substitution” to local value addition. In the modern investment climate and ESG optics, this local value addition unlocks ESG-aligned financing and cheaper DFI (Development Finance Institution) capital.

Investors do not “dislike” Tanzania; they are simply hedging their bets. Via streamlining and finalising of the procedures and locking in the tax regime, Tanzania removes the need for a hedge. It is important to remember that: Mombasa is a port and Tanga is a pipeline terminus, sitting on feedstock. Major difference.

As earlier said, investors do not dislike Tanzania; neither do they love Kenya more. They hedge. Remove the hedge with requisite optimal streamlined no-unnecessary-red-tape approach, not promises.

Bottom line: The real vote of no confidence?

Mroso argued that choice of Mombasa is not just about it being a port, it is a vote of no confidence in Tanzania’s investment policy stability. The belief that Tanga has already lost to Mombasa is a failure of imagination. Dangote has not signed in Kenya; he is exercising his leverage as a sophisticated investor.

He is waiting for a partner who speaks the language of “term sheets” rather than “speeches,” “photo-ops” or “homeboy politicking.” In the long term, the Tanga refinery is better positioned to drive economic integration under the aspirations of AfCFTA, by strengthening the fuel supply chain for landlocked nations in the region.

This development could significantly improve the availability of petroleum products for Zambia (leveraging the existing TAZAMA pipeline) as well as Malawi, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Eastern DRC. Tanga did not lose the refinery.

Tanzania just has not closed the deal yet. If the government can make the institutional system as deep as the port needs to be, the capital will not just arrive; it will stay. In the world of highstakes infrastructure, bankability is a sovereign currency.

Capital does not seek a destination to rest; it seeks a destination to work. Capital will only land where the friction of entry is lower than the reward of operation. Tanzania must stop offering the world a five-tenfifteen-year dream and start offering a 90-day reality. It can transform Tanga from a “project proposal” into a “plug-and-play” certainty.

The message to both the developer and to the global market must be clinical. It is not about asking for an investment in its future; it is providing a de-risked window for immediate execution. Tanga is no longer a plan on a map, it is a term sheet on the table, ready for a signature tomorrow morning