Iran war signals shift toward multipolar global economy

DAR ES SALAAM: WHEN the United States and Israel began bombing Iran on February 28, President Donald Trump described the campaign as a simple “excursion” expected to last a few weeks.

What began as a limited operation has since developed into a prolonged conflict with no clear resolution.

Beyond its impact on global oil supplies and economic conditions, the war has raised broader questions about the changing balance of political, military and economic influence.

The key issue is not simply when the conflict will end, but what it reveals about the changing nature of global power and whether it could accelerate the transition towards a more multipolar international system.

Evidence suggests the conflict has exposed some constraints within the US military system, particularly concerning weapons stockpiles.

Reuters reported this month that the US Army had exhausted virtually all of its Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and precisionstrike missile supplies in the Iran conflict.

Another report indicated that nearly half of the global Tomahawk stockpile had also been used. The implications extend beyond Iran.

These are among the weapons Washington would rely on in a large-scale confrontation with strategic competitors, particularly Russia or China.

The concern is not that the United States has suddenly become militarily weak, but that the conflict has highlighted the limitations of a military system expected to deter several major adversaries simultaneously. History provides useful perspective.

The Vietnam War demonstrated the limits of American military power despite overwhelming technological advantages.

The United States failed to achieve its political objectives and eventually withdrew, while the fall of Saigon in 1975 became a powerful symbol of defeat. Yet Vietnam did not end US global influence.

The American economy remained dominant, its alliances survived and Washington eventually recovered its strategic position. Iraq provides another example.

The US-led invasion in 2003 quickly removed Saddam Hussein’s government, but the subsequent occupation became a lengthy and costly conflict.

Washington eventually withdrew without establishing the stable political system it had sought. Afghanistan caused further damage to America’s international image.

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After two decades of war, US forces withdrew in 2021, allowing the Taliban to regain control.

Despite these setbacks, the United States remained the world’s leading military and economic power. Military setbacks, therefore, do not automatically signal the decline of a superpower.

However, the international environment surrounding the Iran conflict is significantly different. During Vietnam, China had not emerged as a major economic and strategic competitor.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was also considerably weaker.

Washington subsequently enjoyed a period of unrivalled military, economic and technological dominance.

Today, the United States faces a rapidly rising China, a more assertive Russia and multiple regional challenges while maintaining commitments across several theatres.

For Washington, the challenge is therefore not simply achieving its objectives in Iran, but preserving enough military capacity to deter other potential adversaries.

The conflict may have affected perceptions of American military dominance by highlighting the costs of prolonged deployments, pressure on weapons inventories and the difficulty of translating overwhelming military capability into a rapid political outcome. This does not, however, amount to an imminent collapse of American power.

The United States retains enormous military reach, an extensive alliance network, a powerful financial system and significant technological advantages.

The dollar also remains central to international finance. The more important question is whether Washington can adapt to a world in which its dominance is increasingly contested.

The economic consequences of the Iran conflict could prove particularly significant. Iran’s ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz has highlighted the vulnerability of global energy markets to geopolitical shocks.

Disruptions along the strategic waterway can quickly affect oil prices, inflation and production costs far beyond the Middle East. Energy-importing economies, particularly in Africa, are especially exposed.

Higher fuel prices can increase transport, manufacturing and food costs while putting pressure on foreign-exchange reserves and external balances.

The International Monetary Fund has warned that geopolitical tensions and energy disruptions pose substantial risks to countries dependent on imported energy.

The conflict could encourage governments and businesses to diversify energy supplies, develop alternative trade routes and strengthen domestic production.

It could also reinforce efforts to diversify international payment systems and reduce dependence on Western financial channels. Iran’s growing economic relationship with China illustrates this trend.

Under Western sanctions, Tehran has developed alternative trade and financial arrangements, with China becoming an increasingly important economic partner. Such developments do not mean the dollar-based financial system is about to disappear.

They demonstrate, however, how geopolitical pressure can encourage countries to reduce dependence on a single financial and economic centre. China could benefit strategically from this changing environment.

Its economic relationship with Iran, position as a major global trading power and expanding ties across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America give Beijing opportunities to strengthen its influence.

Russia and other regional powers may similarly deepen alternative political, financial and trade relationships, contributing to a gradual shift towards a more multipolar global economy.

In this emerging order, influence will depend increasingly on economic strength, strategic geography, energy security, critical minerals, technology, financial networks and alliances rather than military power alone.

For Africa, the changing landscape presents both risks and opportunities. Countries heavily dependent on imported fuel could face greater exposure to global price shocks, while resource-rich nations may gain bargaining power as major economies compete for critical minerals and other strategic commodities.

Africa’s mineral resources could become particularly important as the United States, China and Europe compete for supplies needed for cleanenergy technologies, advanced manufacturing and digital industries.

African countries will therefore need to manage this competition carefully, seeking investment and technology while protecting national interests and avoiding excessive dependence on any single external power.

The central question is not whether America will suddenly lose its position as the world’s leading power. It remains highly influential militarily, financially, technologically and diplomatically.

Rather, the issue is whether conflicts such as the Iran war will accelerate an existing redistribution of global influence. The evidence points towards a gradual shift rather than a sudden transformation.

The United States remains a dominant global power, but China is increasingly central to the emerging economic order, while regional powers are gaining leverage through energy, geography, resources and trade.

The Iran conflict may therefore prove significant not because it ends American dominance, but because it highlights the growing importance of economic resilience, strategic resources, alliances, technology and energy security.

The Iran war may not eliminate American influence, but it could accelerate the transition towards a more contested and multipolar global economic and geopolitical landscape, with China increasingly at the forefront of that transformation.